When Sir Jim Ratcliffe and new CEO Omar Berrada appointed Rúben Amorim as Manchester United manager in November 2024, the pitch was bold: bring in one of Europe’s hottest young coaches, a man who had guided Sporting Lisbon to titles with a daring three-at-the-back system. It was a statement of intent — proof that INEOS wanted to modernize United’s football operations and break from the old cycle of conservatism.
But nearly a year on, the results are damning. After 33 Premier League games, Amorim has managed just 34 points, the worst return for any permanent United manager in modern history. His win rate in all competitions is 39.6%, lower than even David Moyes or Ole Gunnar Solskjær at their lowest ebb, and the poorest seen since Frank O’Farrell replaced Sir Matt Busby in 1971. O’Farrell was sacked after 560 days; Amorim sits at 325 and feels perilously close to the same fate.
The issue isn’t just the points total. It’s the story behind them — a fundamental failure by INEOS to align squad, system, and strategy.
Ignoring the Football Department
United did not lack for guidance during their managerial search. Dan Ashworth, considered by many the best sporting director in England, had recommended a safer course: hire an experienced Premier League coach, someone who could maximize an imperfect squad built for a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3. Names like Thomas Frank, Marco Silva, or even Eddie Howe were floated. They weren’t flashy, but they were pragmatic.
Sir Jim and Berrada went the other way. Ratcliffe wanted charisma and dynamism; Berrada personally negotiated with Sporting CP to land Amorim. They overruled Ashworth’s advice, convinced they knew better.
The irony is brutal. Within months, Ashworth himself was out the door, his position untenable after being sidelined in the decision-making process. United had paid millions to bring him in, only to discard his input when it mattered most.
A Squad Built for One Style, A Manager Demanding Another
The heart of the problem is tactical. Amorim’s Sporting sides thrived with flying wingbacks, a mobile midfield, and overlapping wide center-backs. But United’s roster was never designed for that. Luke Shaw is no longer physically reliable; Diogo Dalot is serviceable but not elite. The midfield lacks balance — too many ball-players, not enough destroyers. And the backline is thinner than ever, with Lisandro Martínez injury-prone and Harry Maguire ill-suited to Amorim’s high line.
Yet Amorim has been rigid. He insists on three-at-the-back, even as United leak goals and fail to control matches. Rather than adapting to his players, he has tried to hammer square pegs into round holes. And when the results inevitably faltered, he doubled down.
If INEOS knew the budget constraints — and they did, after a £200m summer spend and looming Financial Fair Play limits — then the logical question to Amorim in his interview should have been: What’s your interim plan? How will you manage without a full squad rebuild?
The answer seems to have been “I won’t change.” And incredibly, that was enough to get him the job.
The Cost of a Miscalculation
Now the bill comes due. Reports suggest Amorim’s contract includes a clause that guarantees him around £12 million if he is sacked before November 1, 2025. Fire him today, and United owe that sum. Wait a few weeks, and the figure drops. It’s little surprise, then, that speculation is growing United will ride it out until the clause expires — but every week of drift adds to the malaise around Old Trafford.
Meanwhile, Sir Jim is already working the phones. Gareth Southgate has been contacted directly. Crystal Palace’s Oliver Glasner and Bournemouth’s Andoni Iraola are also on the shortlist. The pattern is obvious: this will be Ratcliffe’s call, not a football-led decision.
That’s the real scandal. United remain trapped in the same cycle of boardroom interference that has undermined them for over a decade. Business executives dictate football strategy, while the director of football is reduced to a secondary voice.
What United Actually Need
The philosophy isn’t complicated. Manchester United need to rediscover what their footballing identity is supposed to be.
- Attacking pace on the wings — the likes of Cunha, Amad, and Mbuemo thrive in space, not in systems that shoehorn them into wingback roles.
- A genuine 20-goal striker — a Harry Kane type, who finishes chances and anchors the attack.
- Dogs in midfield — fighters who cover ground, win second balls, and protect the backline.
- A scary, stable defense — Martínez when fit, but reinforced with leaders who can actually defend one-v-one.
That blueprint points not to another European experiment, but to a proven Premier League coach. Someone flexible enough to work with an incomplete squad and deliver results in the short term while the rebuild continues. Someone steady with the media, capable of lowering the temperature around the club. Someone who can reset the culture in the dressing room.
Eddie Howe fits, but would be prohibitively expensive. Ole Gunnar Solskjær remains available for an interim stint. Southgate, for all his flaws, ticks INEOS’ boxes as a “cheap, steady hand” who will not rock the boat.
But the real fix is structural: football decisions must be led by football people. A director of football should define the style United want to play and select a manager who fits that philosophy, not the other way around. Until INEOS accept that, United will continue to stumble from one misaligned project to the next.
The Bigger Picture: INEOS’ Errors
Ratcliffe admitted in a recent interview that INEOS has made “one or two mistakes” since taking over. That’s an understatement.
- They sidelined their most experienced football executive (Ashworth) during the most important decision.
- They appointed a manager without the resources to implement his system.
- They signed off on a contract that makes it financially painful to correct the error quickly.
- And now, less than two years into their stewardship, they face yet another managerial crisis.
It’s not just Amorim’s failure. It’s INEOS’ hubris — believing they knew better than the football experts they hired.
The End Feels Inevitable
For now, Amorim insists he is “not concerned.” Sir Jim Ratcliffe is publicly backing him, saying he deserves time to build “the right team.” But the stats don’t lie. Thirty-four points from 33 games is relegation form, not Champions League chasing. The system doesn’t fit, the players look lost, and the manager refuses to adapt.
Whether it’s November 1 or December 1, the end looks inevitable. The only question is how much more damage United will endure before it comes.
Conclusion: Divorcing Business from Football
The lesson is simple. If Manchester United want to escape this cycle, INEOS must separate the business from the football. Let the director of football set the style, control the recruitment, and pick the manager. Let executives like Berrada run the finances, not the dressing room.
Until then, United will remain trapped in this loop: wealthy owners making expensive mistakes, flashy appointments that don’t fit, and managers doomed before they begin. Amorim is only the latest chapter. The real story is that the structure itself is broken.
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